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Abstract In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework for analysing competing
double auction marketplaces that vie for traders and make proﬁts by charging fees. Firstly,
we analyse the equilibrium strategies for the traders’ market selection decision for given
market fees using evolutionary game theory. Using this approach, we investigate how traders
dynamically change their strategies, and thus, which equilibrium, if any, can be reached. In
so doing, we show that, when the same type of fees are charged by two marketplaces, it
is unlikely that competing marketplaces will continue to co-exist when traders converge
to their equilibrium market selection strategies. Eventually, all the traders will congregate
in one marketplace. However, when dierent types of fees are allowed (registration fees
and proﬁt fees), competing marketplaces are more likely to co-exist in equilibrium. We
also ﬁnd that sometimes all the traders eventually migrate to the marketplace that charges
higher fees. We then further analyse this phenomenon, and speciﬁcally analyse how bidding
strategies and random exploration of traders aects this migration respectively. Secondly,
we analyse the equilibrium strategies of the marketplaces when they have the ability to vary
their fees in response to changes in the traders’ market selection strategies. In this case,
we consider the competition of the marketplaces as a two-stage game, where the traders’
market selection strategies are conditional on the market fees. In particular, we use a co-
evolutionary approach to analyse how competing marketplaces dynamically set fees while
taking into account the dynamics of the traders’ market selection strategies. In so doing, we
ﬁnd that two identical marketplaces undercut each other, and they will eventually charge
the minimal fee as we set that guarantees positive market proﬁts for them. Furthermore,
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we extend the co-evolutionary analysis of the marketplaces’ fee strategies to more general
cases. Speciﬁcally, we analyse how an initially disadvantaged marketplace with an adaptive
fee strategy can outperform an initially advantaged one with a ﬁxed fee strategy, or even one
with an adaptive fee strategy, and how competing marketplaces evolve their fee strategies
when dierent types of fees are allowed.
Keywords Competing Double Auction Marketplaces  Market Selection Strategy  Fee
Strategy  Evolutionary Game Theory  Co-Evolutionary Approach
1 Introduction
Exchanges,inwhichsecurities,futures,stocksandcommoditiescanbetraded,arebecoming
ever more prevalent. Now, many of these adopt the double auction market mechanism which
is a particular type of two-sided marketplace with multiple buyers (one side) and multiple
sellers (the other side) (Friedman and Rust, 1993). Speciﬁcally, in such a mechanism, traders
can submit oers at any time in a speciﬁed trading round and they will be matched by the
marketplace at a speciﬁed time. The advantages of this mechanism are that traders can en-
ter the marketplace at any time and they can trade multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous
items in one place without travelling around several marketplaces. In addition, this mecha-
nism is highly ecient in terms of trading goods between buyers and sellers (Smith, 1962).
These beneﬁts have led many electronic marketplaces to also use this format. For example,
Google oers DoubleClick Ad Exchange (http://www.doubleclick.com), which is a
real-time double auction marketplace enabling large online ad publishers, on one side, and
adnetworksandagencies,ontheotherside,tobuyandselladvertisingspace.Anotherexam-
ple is FastParts (http://www.fastparts.com), which provides a double auction to trade
excess electronic components and used manufacturing equipments. However, because of the
globalised economy, such marketplaces do not exist in isolation. Thus they compete against
each other to attract traders and make proﬁts by charging fees. For example, stock exchanges
compete to attract companies to list their stocks in their marketplaces and make proﬁts by
charging listing fees to these companies. Google’s DoubleClick Ad Exchange competes
against other ad exchanges, such as Microsoft’s AdECN (http://www.adecn.com) and
Yahoo!’s Right Media (http://www.rightmedia.com) in order to attract ad publishers
and ad networks and agencies. Thus such inter-marketplace competition is becoming an
increasingly important area of research.
Speciﬁcally, for such contexts, there exist two key research issues. The ﬁrst is how the
traders select which marketplace to participate in (the market selection strategies). This
problem is challenging since this choice not only depends on the fees charged by the mar-
ketplaces, but also on so-called network eects, whereby a trader’s welfare depends on the
number and types of other traders already present. Then, given the traders’ strategies for
selecting marketplaces, the second issue is how competing marketplaces should set their
fees to make proﬁts (the fee strategies). Intuitively, we can see that there exists a conﬂict
between attracting traders and making proﬁts. This is because when the fees are increased to
try and increase proﬁts, traders are likely to leave the marketplace which, in turn, will cause
a decrease in proﬁts for that marketplace. Thus the competing marketplace has to be able to
set appropriate fees to maximise its proﬁt, while at the same time maintain market share at
a good level. Against this background, in this paper, we analyse the equilibrium strategies
of traders for selecting a marketplace as well as marketplaces for setting fees. The insights
from this analysis will be useful to guide the design of a competing marketplace in terms of
setting fees.3
In this context, a number of theoretical models have been proposed to analyse competing
two-sided marketplaces (see Section 2 for details). However, most of this work only con-
siders the positive network eect (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007; Kartz and Shapiro, 1985),
whereby, buyers(sellers) prefer marketplaces which have a larger number of sellers(buyers)
since this gives the buyers(sellers) access to more choices. Such an eect will always push
all traders towards concentrating into a single marketplace. However, these works usually
ignore the internal competition between traders on the same side (i.e. between buyers and
between sellers). In practice, traders on one side will typically compete with each other in
order to be matched with traders on the other side.1 This is also called a negative network
eect (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007; Kartz and Shapiro, 1985) where traders prefer market-
places with fewer other traders on the same side. In our setting we consider double auction
marketplaces to match traders to trade goods and set transaction prices (which are aected
by demand and supply), and thereby consider both positive and negative network eects.
This negative network eect is important because it encourages traders to distribute across
dierent marketplaces, thereby making it more likely for several competing marketplaces
to co-exist in the long term. Moreover, most of the existing work on competing two-sided
marketplaces assumes that all traders are homogeneous (i.e. have the same preferences), and
the marketplaces have complete information about the preferences (also called the types) of
traders. In real-world auction marketplaces, however, traders usually have heterogeneous
preferences which are privately known. In this case, the traders, in choosing their market-
places, not only care about the number of other traders, but also their types. Furthermore, in
the real world, competing marketplaces may charge dierent types of fees to make proﬁts,
which may have dierent eects on traders’ market selection. Speciﬁcally, there exist two
types of fees which are usually charged by real-world marketplaces: ex ante fees, which are
charged to traders when they enter the marketplace, and ex post fees, which are charged to
traders after they make transactions. In our work, we will consider all these factors, and in
doing so, are the ﬁrst to comprehensively analyse competing double auction marketplaces
from a theoretical perspective.2
In more detail, in this paper, we assume that there are heterogeneous traders with pri-
vately known preferences, and consider registration and proﬁt fees as typical examples of ex
ante and ex post fees respectively. Based on these assumptions, we theoretically analyse the
market selection strategies for traders and the fee strategies for marketplaces. Intuitively,
we can see that how a trader selects a marketplace depends on other traders’ decisions
as well as the marketplaces’ fees, and that how a competing marketplace sets its fees de-
pends on traders’ market selection decisions and other marketplaces’ fees. Thus game the-
ory (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), which mathematically studies such strategic interactions
between self-interested agents (where an individual’s success in making choices depends
on the choices of others), is appropriate to be used for analysing our system. However, due
to the high complexity of this game with multiple traders and marketplaces and with in-
complete information about traders’ types, it is infeasible to use traditional game theory to
analytically derive the equilibrium strategies. Therefore, in this paper, we adopt evolution-
ary game theory (EGT) to analyse the equilibrium strategies for traders and marketplaces.
This approach was originated by John Maynard-Smith, who applied game theory to biology
(Maynard-Smith, 1982). It oers a way to compute the equilibrium strategies for players,
and has been widely used to analyse complicated games (e.g. Phelps et al, 2006, 2010;
Vytelingum et al, 2008a). Speciﬁcally, in this paper, we will use replicator dynamics, which
1 For example, in the two-sided marketplace providing dating service for males and females, males (one side) have to
compete with each other in order to date (be matched with) females (the other side).
2 There exists some empirical work that also considers these factors (see Section 2).4
are used in EGT to control the learning process, to computationally determine the equilib-
rium strategies. Furthermore, in order to allow for a tractable analysis for this complicated
game, we limit the number of trader types (to two). This canonical setting is common in
theoretical work in this broad area and allows us to distill the key insights and patterns of
behaviour which can then be extended by others.
This paper advances the state-of-the-art in the following ways. Firstly, after proposing
a game-theoretic framework, we use evolutionary game theory to compute the Nash equi-
librium (the most common solution concept in game theory) market selection strategies for
traders given dierent market fees. We analyse how traders dynamically change their mar-
ket selection strategies and which of the equilibria can be reached. In doing so, we also
investigate whether competing marketplaces can co-exist, and the competition can be main-
tained, or whether the marketplaces collapse to a monopoly setting where all traders move to
one marketplace. This is important since competition drives eciency and oers more and
better choices to traders. We show that, based on the assumptions of our framework, when
the same type of fees are charged, it is unlikely that multiple competing marketplaces will
co-exist despite the negative network eect; all traders will simply converge to one of the
marketplaces in equilibrium. However, when dierent types of fees are allowed, competing
marketplaces can co-exist. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that all traders may converge to the mar-
ketplace that charges higher fees when the marketplace initially has a larger market share.
This means that the marketplace can maintain both a high number of traders and high prof-
its. We then analyse this interesting phenomenon in more detail. Speciﬁcally, we analyse in
what situations traders select the marketplace that charges higher fees and how this selection
is aected by traders’ bidding behaviour and random exploration. After having established
the traders’ equilibrium strategies, we proceed to analyse how marketplaces should set their
fees to make proﬁts in equilibrium by taking into account the inﬂuence of traders’ strate-
gies on marketplaces’ fee strategies. This is modeled as a two-stage game where, in the ﬁrst
stage, competing marketplaces set their fees and, in the second stage, traders select a market-
place conditional on these fees. We can see that the traders’ market selection strategies and
the marketplaces’ fee strategies are closely intertwined. Thus we use a co-evolutionary ap-
proach to analyse this game. We ﬁrst consider that competing marketplaces charge the same
type of fees. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that two initially identical competing marketplaces will
eventually charge the minimal fee that guarantees positive market proﬁts for them. Further-
more, we show that an initially disadvantaged marketplace with an adaptive fee strategy can
beat the initially advantaged one with a ﬁxed fee strategy. We also ﬁnd that, by dynamically
evolving the fee strategy, it is possible for the marketplace that is initially at a disadvantage
to outperform its opponent, even when the opponent is also able to evolve its fee strategy.
We then extend the analysis to the case where dierent types of fees are allowed. We ﬁnd
that one marketplace eventually attracts all traders and then charges a very high fee.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related
work. In Section 3, we describe the game-theoretic framework. In Section 4, we analyse the
traders’ equilibrium strategies for market selection for given (ﬁxed) market fees. In Section
5, we use a co-evolutionary approach to analyse equilibrium fee strategies of competing
marketplaces. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Work
As mentioned in the introduction, many theoretical models analysing competing two-sided
marketplaces only consider the positive network eect, where buyers will prefer market-5
places with more sellers and vice versa for sellers. This gives rise to a “chicken and egg”
problem which lies at the core of two-sided marketplaces: to attract buyers (one side), a
marketplace should have a large base of the registered sellers (the other side), but these will
be willing to register only if they expect many buyers to show up. One of the most important
works on this problem is from Caillaud and Jullien (2003), who analysed the competition
between two marketplaces. In their work, they assume that traders are homogeneous and
the market selection only depends on the number of traders of the other side. For this set-
ting, they analyse a “divide-and-conquer” strategy of subsidizing one side of the traders (by
charging negative registration fees) while recovering loss (by charging positive transaction
fees) from the other side. They show that, when traders can only enter one marketplace at
a time, by adopting the “divide-and-conquer” strategy, in equilibrium, one marketplace will
attract all traders, but it has to give up all proﬁt. Another work in this vein is by Damiano
and Hao (2008), in which traders select marketplaces only according to the quality charac-
teristics (type) of the other side of traders, instead of the number of traders, and thus they
do not consider network eects. Recent work by Lee (2008) analyses under what conditions
two competing marketplaces can co-exist. They point out that strong marketplace dieren-
tiation or weak positive network eect can make competing marketplaces co-exist. This is
consistent with our analysis, where we ﬁnd that, when competing marketplaces dierentiate
from one another by charging dierent types of fees, they may co-exist in equilibrium.
Although the above work is related, none of these papers speciﬁcally consider double
auctionmarketplacestomatchtraders.Thischangestheproblembecause,inthecompetition
of double auction marketplaces, the market selection strategy of the traders not only depends
on the number of traders choosing the marketplaces, but also on their own types and those
of other traders choosing the marketplaces. Furthermore, in addition to the positive network
eect, there also exist negative network eects. Competition between two double auction
marketplaces is considered by Ellison et al (2004). They show that, in some cases, the neg-
ative network eect has a larger impact than the positive network eect, and traders will
not migrate from this state, which means that two competing marketplaces can co-exist in
equilibrium. This model is similar to ours since we also consider heterogeneous traders and
both positive and negative size eects. However, Ellison et al (2004) make the simplifying
assumption that traders choose a marketplace before learning their own types, and thus the
market selection strategy is independent of a trader’s type. Therefore, unlike in our model,
using their model, they show that similar marketplaces can co-exist in equilibrium. In con-
trast, we ﬁnd that traders will converge to one marketplace except for the case where there
is strong market dierentiation (i.e. where competing marketplaces charge dierent types of
fees).
The other strand of work that explores this area is primarily related to the Market Design
Competition (CAT), which was ﬁrst introduced as part of the Trading Agent Competition
(TAC) in 2007 (Gerding et al, 2007a). This competition considers a complicated setting
for competing double auction marketplaces. In more detail, in this competition, entrants
need to design eective market policies and set appropriate fees to attract traders and make
proﬁts. There are a large number of traders, which have privately known types and can
move freely between dierent marketplaces to choose the one that they think will be most
proﬁtable.Intuitively,wecanimagine thattraders’migrationwillsigniﬁcantlydeterminethe
ﬁnal competition results. For this setting, Niu et al (2007) provide an experimental analysis
of traders’ market selection strategies. They show that, when traders are able to explore to
search for the most proﬁtable marketplace, they exhibit a strong tendency to converge to the
marketplaces charging low fees. They also show that the migration of traders is aected by
dierent exploration algorithms. Then, based on this work, Cai et al (2008) ran experiments6
to analyse the impact of multiple marketplaces on the allocative eciency.3 They show
that dividing traders over multiple marketplaces leads to a loss of allocative eciency, and
the loss is reduced when traders are allowed to choose the most proﬁtable marketplace. In
addition, a number of entrants have described their speciﬁc design of the competing double
auction marketplaces for recent years’ CAT competition (Vytelingum et al, 2008b; Petric
et al, 2008; Stavrogiannis and Mitkas, 2009; Honari et al, 2009). All of these works make
important contributions on the research of competing double auction marketplaces, where
they undertake empirical analysis in the complex setting for the competing double auction
marketplaces. In contrast, we consider a reduced form for this setting to start the theoretical
analysis. In Sohn et al (2009), a simple game-theoretic model is proposed to analyse market
selection in the CAT context. However, it assumes a game with complete information about
the traders’ types, in contrast to reality, where traders’ types are usually privately known.
Finally,inourpreviouswork(Shietal,2010a),wehavecarriedoutapreliminaryanalysison
how traders bid and select a marketplace in the context of multiple competing marketplaces
and continuous trader types. However, in this work, we did not consider how competing
marketplaces set fees to make proﬁts while still maintaining traders.
Another important line of work considering competition between marketplaces is due
to McAfee (1993), Burguet and Sakovics (1999) and Gerding et al (2007b), who consider
single-sided competition. In particular, they consider competition between sellers who oer
similar goods to buyers and can set their own reserve prices to attract buyers in multiple
single-sided auctions. The work of McAfee (1993) is based on strong assumptions (e.g. it
assumes that any individual seller has no signiﬁcant impact on buyers’ proﬁts), which are
only reasonable in the case of inﬁnitely many players. Then Burguet and Sakovics (1999)
relax some of these assumptions and show that there always exists an equilibrium for the
sellers, but this cannot be a symmetric one in pure strategies. Furthermore, Gerding et al
(2007b) show that pure Nash equilibria for the asymmetric seller setting exist. They also
extend the above analysis by considering how market fees aect sellers’ strategies. However,
this model only considers the case with one seller in each marketplace, i.e. single-sided
marketplaces. Our setting considering double auction marketplaces with multiple buyers
and multiple sellers, is much more complex and the results for the single-sided analysis
cannot readily be transferred over.
Furthermore, in addition to the analysis of traders’ market selection strategies in the
competing marketplace environment, there also exist works regarding bidding strategies
across multiple marketplace (e.g. Byde et al, 2002; Anthony and Jennings, 2006; He et al,
2006). However, these works focus on the traders’ bidding behaviour across multiple single-
sided auctions (such as English Auction, Dutch Auction, etc), and thus cannot be adopted
for our double auction setting. In our work, at this stage, we assume that traders adopt a
simple bidding strategy (the ray bidding strategy, see Selten and Buchta, 1998; Zhan and
Firedman, 2007), although future work is needed to consider the impact of more complex
strategies.
The above theoretical works mainly adopt traditional game theory to analyse compet-
ing marketplaces. In addition to this, a number of researchers have used evolutionary game
theory (EGT) to analyse traders’ strategies and market policies (e.g. Phelps et al, 2006,
2010; Vytelingum et al, 2008a). However, their analysis is restricted to isolated double auc-
tion marketplaces without considering competition between them. In this paper, we use,
for the ﬁrst time, EGT to analyse traders’ market selection strategies as well as the market-
3 This is the total proﬁt earned by all traders in the marketplace divided by the maximum possible total proﬁt that could
have been earned by all traders.7
places’ fee strategies in the context of multiple competing marketplaces. This setting is more
involved mainly for two reasons. First, we assume incomplete information about traders’
types. Second, we model the market as a two-stage game, where in the ﬁrst stage the mar-
ketplaces set their fees, and in the second stage traders choose marketplace conditional on
these fees. Although some simple multi-stage games, such as the two-stage ultimatum game
(Binmore et al, 1995), have been analysed using EGT, our setting, which considers a game
with heterogeneous players and incomplete information, is considerably more complex.
3 A Game-Theoretic Framework for Competing Marketplaces
In this section, we introduce the game-theoretic framework which forms the basis of our
analysis. In our system, we assume that traders can only choose a single marketplace at
a time (called single-homing). We choose this setting because such a trading mechanism
results in a highly competitive environment (where marketplaces have to compete ﬁercely
with each other to attract traders) compared to a multi-home trading setting where traders
can participate in multiple marketplaces at a time, and we are interested in analysing how
both traders and marketplaces behave strategically in such an environment. A trading round
in our setting proceeds as follows. First, all marketplaces simultaneously publish their fees.
Second, based on observed fees, each trader selects a marketplace according to its market
selection strategy. Third, traders submit their oers according to their bidding strategies (in
the following, we refer to the oers of buyers as bids and the oers of sellers as asks).
Finally, after all traders have submitted their oers, the marketplace matches buyers and
sellers and then executes transactions.4 In the following, we start by introducing the basic
notation of our framework. Then we introduce the notions of marketplaces’ fee strategies
and traders’ market selection strategies respectively. Finally, we provide the deﬁnition of
equilibrium strategies in the context of our system.
3.1 Buyers and Sellers
We consider a set of buyers, B = f1;2;:::Bg, and a set of sellers, S = f1;2;:::Sg. Each
buyer is interested in purchasing one item, and each seller has one item for sale. All items
are identical. Each buyer and seller has a type, which is denoted as b 2 B and s 2
S respectively, where B is the set of buyer types and S is the set of seller types. We
assume these sets to be ﬁnite. The type of a buyer denotes its limit price, i.e. the highest
price it is willing to buy the item for, and the type of a seller denotes its cost price, i.e.
the lowest price it is willing to sell the item for. We assume that types of all buyers are
independently drawn according to the same probability mass function f b over the ﬁnite set
of buyer types B, and the types of all sellers are independently drawn according to the
same probability mass function f s over the ﬁnite set of seller types S. In our framework,
the set of types B and S, and the probability mass functions f b and f s are assumed
to be common knowledge. However, the type of each speciﬁc trader is not known to the
other traders or the marketplaces. In addition, we assume that there is a set of competing
marketplaces M = f1;2;:::Mg, that oer places for trade and provide a centralised matching
service between the buyers and sellers.
4 This means that we consider clearing house double auctions. By adopting this mechanism, and adopting an appropriate
matching policy which we will introduce in the following, the marketplaces can match traders in a highly ecient way.8
3.2 Marketplaces and Fees
Since we consider marketplaces to be commercial enterprises that seek to make a proﬁt, we
assume that they charge fees for their service as match makers. To this end, we deﬁne a fee
structure of a marketplace m to be the tuple pm = (rm;qm) 2 P, rm  0 and qm 2 [0;1],
where rm is a ﬁxed registration fee charged to a trader when it enters the marketplace, and
qm is the so-called proﬁt fee. The latter is a percentage charged on the trader’s observed
proﬁt, which is deﬁned as the dierence between the trader’s oer and the transaction price.
Furthermore, P is a ﬁnite set of all allowable fee structures. Then the fee structures of all
competing marketplaces constitute a fee system ¯ P = hp1; p2;:::pMi 2 PM, where PM is a
ﬁnite set of all allowable fee systems.
Now we describe how a marketplace will set its fee structure. In this work, we consider
a mixed fee strategy, where each fee structure is selected with some probability. A pure
strategy can be regarded as a degenerate case of a mixed strategy, where the particular pure
strategy is selected with probability 1 and every other strategy with probability 0. Now, a
mixed fee strategy of the marketplace m is deﬁned as m : P ! [0;1], which means that the
probability that the marketplace m sets fee structure pm is m(pm), where
P
pm2P m(pm) =
1. We use ¯  = h1();:::M()i to represent the fee strategy proﬁle of all marketplaces. In
addition, we use  m() to represent the fee strategy proﬁle of all marketplaces except for
marketplace m. Then we can rewrite ¯  as ¯  = hm(); m()i.
Finally, we use a discriminatory k-pricing policy to determine the transaction price of
a matched buyer and seller, which is common in double auction marketplaces. Speciﬁcally,
the transaction price of a successful interaction in marketplace m is determined by a pa-
rameter km 2 [0;1], which sets the transaction price of a matched buyer and seller at the
point determined by km in the interval between their oers. The pricing parameters of all
marketplaces constitute the pricing system ¯ K = hk1;k2;:::;kMi.5
3.3 Traders’ Market Selection Strategies
After describing the fee strategies of the marketplaces, we now introduce the traders’ mar-
ket selection strategies. We assume that each trader has a mixed market selection strat-
egy, whereby each marketplace is selected with some probability. As we mentioned pre-
viously, after all marketplaces publish their fees, traders select a marketplace. Therefore,
traders’ market selection strategies are conditional on the fee system. Speciﬁcally, a mixed
market selection strategy of buyer i is deﬁned as a function !b
i : B  M  PM !
[0;1], where !b
i (b;m; ¯ P) denotes the probability that buyer i with type b 2 B chooses
the marketplace m 2 M in the fee system ¯ P, satisfying
P
m2M !b
i (b;m; ¯ P)  1. Here,
1  
P
m2M !b
i (b;m; ¯ P) is the probability that buyer i with type b chooses no marketplace.
This happens when buyer i ﬁnds it has a negative expected proﬁt in each marketplace. We
use ¯ !b( ¯ P) = h!b
1(; ¯ P);:::;!b
B(; ¯ P)i to represent the strategy proﬁle of all buyers in the fee
system ¯ P. In addition, we use !b
 i(; ¯ P) to represent the strategy proﬁle of all buyers ex-
cept i. Then ¯ !b( ¯ P) can be rewritten as ¯ !b( ¯ P) = h!b
i (; ¯ P);!b
 i(; ¯ P)i. Similarly, we use
!s
j : S  M  ¯ P ! [0;1] to deﬁne the probability of selecting a marketplace of seller
j and use ¯ !s( ¯ P) = h!s
1(; ¯ P);:::;!s
S(; ¯ P)i to represent the strategy proﬁle of all sellers in the
fee system ¯ P, and rewrite it as ¯ !s( ¯ P) = h!s
j(; ¯ P);!s
 j(; ¯ P)i.
5 In this work we use a ﬁxed pricing policy and so it does not form part of the strategy of a marketplace, but the framework
can be easily extended to include this as part of the strategy as well.9
3.4 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium Strategies for Selecting a Marketplace and Setting Fees
Before we can analyse how traders select marketplaces and how competing marketplaces set
fees (which we discuss in Section 4 and 5 respectively), we ﬁrst need to specify the expected
utility functions for traders and marketplaces, and deﬁne an appropriate solution concept in
the context of competing marketplaces.
To this end, we ﬁrst describe a buyer’s expected utility equation for a given fee system ¯ P.
A seller’s expected utility can be given analogously. Given a buyers’ strategy proﬁle ¯ !b( ¯ P)
and a sellers’ strategy proﬁle ¯ !s( ¯ P) in the fee system ¯ P, the expected utility of a buyer i with
type b in the fee system ¯ P is deﬁned by:
˜ Ub
i ( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b) =
m=M X
m=1
!b
i (b;m; ¯ P)  ˜ Ub
i;m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b) (1)
where ˜ Ub
i;m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b) is buyer i’s expected utility if it chooses to trade in mar-
ketplace m.
Furthermore, marketplace m’s expected utility given a fee strategy proﬁle ¯  and traders’
market selection strategy proﬁles ¯ !b() and ¯ !s(), is as follows:
˜ Um(¯ ) =
X
pm2P
m(pm)  ˜ Um(pm; m()) (2)
where ˜ Um(pm; m()) is marketplace m’s expected utility when its fee structure is pm, which
is given by:
˜ Um(pm; m()) =
X
¯ P2PM: pm= ¯ P(m)
Y
l2Mnfmg
l( ¯ P(l))  ˜ Um( ¯ P; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P)) (3)
where ˜ Um( ¯ P; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P)) is marketplace m’s expected utility in the fee system ¯ P. Note that
both the buyer’s expected utility in marketplace m, ˜ Ub
i;m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b), and market-
place m’s expected utility, ˜ Um( ¯ P; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P)), depend on the speciﬁc bidding strategies
adopted by traders and matching policy adopted by marketplace m. We will detail them in
Section 4.1 and 5.2 respectively where we consider a particular market setting.
After providing general forms for the traders and the marketplaces’ expected utilities,
now we are ready to deﬁne the equilibrium strategies of traders and marketplaces in our
system. Since we consider a game with incomplete information about traders’ types, the
Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) solution concept, in which each player’s strategy maximises
its expected utility given other players’ strategies, is the most appropriate to deﬁne this equi-
librium behaviour. Here, we deﬁne equilibrium strategies of both traders and marketplaces
as a whole, since in our system, traders’ market selection strategies and marketplaces’ fee
strategies aect each other. Formally, the mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium in our setting is
deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition Given pricing system ¯ K, a fee strategy proﬁle ¯  and market selection strategy
proﬁles ¯ !b() and ¯ !s() constitute a mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium, if
8i 2 B;8b 2 B;8 ¯ P 2 PM;8!b
i (; ¯ P) 2 T
˜ Ub
i ( ¯ P; ¯ K;h!b
i (; ¯ P);!b
 i(; ¯ P)i; ¯ !s( ¯ P);b)  ˜ Ub
i ( ¯ P; ¯ K;h!b
i (; ¯ P);!b
 i(; ¯ P)i; ¯ !s( ¯ P);b);
i.e. each buyer’s strategy is a best response to other traders’ strategies for each possible
fee system,10
and8j 2 S;8s 2 S;8 ¯ P 2 PM;8!s
j(; ¯ P) 2 T
˜ Us
j( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P);h!s
j (; ¯ P);!s
 j(; ¯ P)i;s)  ˜ Us
j( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P);h!s
j(; ¯ P);!s
 j(; ¯ P)i;s);
i.e. each seller’s strategy is a best response to other traders’ strategies for each possible
fee system,
and8m 2 M;8m() 2 M
˜ Um(h
m();
 m()i)  ˜ Um(hm();
 m()i)
i.e. each marketplace’s fee strategy is a best response to other marketplaces’ fee strategies,
where T is the set of all possible (mixed) market selection strategies and M is the set of
all possible (mixed) fee strategies.
Given the equilibrium deﬁnition, in what follows, we will analyse both the traders’
equilibrium market selection strategies (in Section 4) and the marketplaces’ equilibrium
fee strategies (in Section 5).
4 Equilibrium Analysis of the Market Selection Strategies
Based on the general framework for analysing competing double auction marketplaces, we
now use evolutionary game theory to analyse the traders’ equilibrium strategies of market
selection for a given fee system ¯ P = hp1;:::; pMi (i.e. each marketplace m 2 M sets the
fee structure pm with 100% probability (m(pm) = 1)). Before doing this, however, we
ﬁrst need to specify the bidding strategies adopted by traders and the matching policies
adopted by the marketplaces. Since the bidding strategy in double auctions is a research
area in its own right (well-known strategies include AA–Vytelingum et al, 2008a, GD–
Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998, and ZIP–Cli and Bruten, 1997), and here our focus is on the
market selection strategies, we consider a simple bidding strategy for traders. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that traders use a ray bidding strategy (Turocy, 2001).6 Although towards the
simple end of the spectrum, this strategy has the property that traders can shade their oers,
which means that buyers submit bids less than their types and sellers submit asks higher
than their types (in doing so, traders hide their actual types and have the potential to obtain
more revenue in the trade). Furthermore, this strategy has a good form of mathematical
representation, and thus can be easily incorporated into our mathematical framework. More
complex strategies are unsuitable since they are hard to be represented in a mathematical
way because they typically rely on ad hoc heuristics and parameter tuning. In more detail,
in our system, we assume that the highest and the lowest allowed oer for all traders is ¯ A
and A respectively. Then we use ab (0  ab  1) to denote the bid factor for buyers, which
indicates the degree of buyers shading their oers. Now for a buyer with type b, it will
shade (1   ab)  (b   A), which is from 0 to b   A. Therefore, it will submit a bid
b(b) = b   (1   ab)  (b   A) = ab  b + (1   ab)  A (4)
6 The original ray bidding strategy is designed for buyers in single-sided auctions. Speciﬁcally, in this bidding strategy,
buyers will submit bids as fractions of their types. For example, for the buyer with type b, it will submit a bid b(b) = ab,
where a satisfying 0  a  1 is the bid factor for buyers, which indicates what factions of values buyers will bid (and also
indicates the degree of buyers shading their bids), and therefore 0  b(b)  b. However, when traders adopt the ray
bidding strategy in double auctions, we should note that when buyers submit bids lower than the lowest seller types (or
sellers submit asks higher than the highest buyer types), they never make transactions. Therefore, in double auctions, we
need to adapt the ray bidding strategy to ensure that traders’ oers are within in an appropriate range, in order to guarantee
potential transactions. See Equations 4 and 5 for the details.11
From this, we can see that, when ab = 1, buyers bid truthfully, and when ab = 0, buyers
shade at the maximum degree. Similarly, we use as (0  as  1) to indicate the degree of
sellers shading their asks. Then a seller with type s will submit an ask:
s(s) = s + (1   as)  ( ¯ A   s) = as  s + (1   as)  ¯ A (5)
Similarly, when as = 1, sellers will ask truthfully, and when as = 0, sellers will shade at
the maximum degree. Note that although bidding strategies are known by traders, they will
not know what exact oers other traders will submit since they do not know the exact types
of their counterparts. For the matching policy, we consider the commonly used equilibrium
matching since this aims to maximise traders’ proﬁts and thus maximises the allocative
eciencyforthe marketplace.Indetail,thispolicywillmatch thebuyerwiththev-thhighest
bid with the seller with the v-th lowest ask if the seller’s ask is not greater than the buyer’s
bid. Given the speciﬁc bidding strategy and matching policy, in the following, we will derive
traders’ expected utilities in this setting, and then analyse traders’ equilibrium strategies of
market selection for dierent fee systems. We are interested in calculating the symmetric
Bayes-Nash equilibria (BNEs), as is common in game theory for settings with incomplete
information, and so we can assume that (in equilibrium) traders with the same type will
employ the same strategy. Thus in the following equations, we omit the indexes i and j
when referring to speciﬁc buyers and sellers.
4.1 A Trader’s Expected Utility
Before analysing the equilibrium strategies of traders, we ﬁrst need to calculate their ex-
pected utilities, given the ray bidding strategy and equilibrium matching policy. In what
follows, we derive the expected utility of a buyer with type b in the fee system ¯ P when it
adopts the ray bidding strategy given the market selection strategy proﬁles of buyers and
sellers, ¯ !b( ¯ P) and ¯ !s( ¯ P). The seller’s expected utility is calculated analogously. According
to Equation 1, we need to calculate the trader’s expected utility in each marketplace m. In-
tuitively, the trader’s expected utility in marketplace m not only depends on its own type
and bid, but also on other bids and asks appearing in this marketplace. Therefore, we should
know the bid and ask distributions for buyers and sellers respectively. Given the ray bid-
ding strategy and the ﬁnite set of trader types, we can derive the set of allowable oers for
traders. Speciﬁcally, we denote the set of allowable bids as Db = fdbjdb = b(b);b 2 Bg,
and denote the set of allowable asks as Ds = fdsjds = s(s);s 2 Sg.7 Now, given buyers’
type distribution function f b, market selection strategy proﬁle ¯ !b( ¯ P), we can derive the bid
distribution of buyers. For example, the probability of the bid db = b(b) submitted by a
buyer in marketplace m is:
b
m(dbj ¯ P) = f b(b)  !b(b;m; ¯ P) (6)
Note that this is also the probability that the buyer has type b and chooses marketplace m.
The probability of the ask ds submitted by a seller in marketplace m is:
s
m(dsj ¯ P) = f s(s)  !s(s;m; ¯ P) (7)
7 From Equations 4 and 5, we can see that dierent types of traders have dierent oers, and thus jDbj = jBj and
jDsj = jSj.12
Note that the bid and ask distributions are also conditional on the fee system since market
selection strategies are conditional on this. Given the bid and ask distributions, we now
derive the buyer’s expected utility in the following.
First, we introduce four support functions. For buyers, we have:
hb
m(d) =
X
d02Db:d0>d
b
m(dj ¯ P) (8)
which denotes the probability that a buyer’s bid is strictly higher than d in marketplace m;
eb
m(d) = b
m(dj ¯ P) (9)
which denotes the probability that a buyer’s bid is equal to d in marketplace m; and then
1   hb
m(d)   eb
m(d) is the probability that the buyer’s bid is strictly less than d in marketplace
m or the buyer does not choose marketplace m. Similarly, for sellers, we have:
hs
m(d) =
X
d02Ds:d0<d
s
m(dj ¯ P) (10)
which denotes the probability that a seller’s ask is strictly less than d in marketplace m;
es
m(d) = s
m(dj ¯ P) (11)
which denotes the probability that a seller’s ask is equal to d in marketplace m; and then
1 hs
m(d) es
m(d) is the probability that the seller’s ask is strictly higher than d in marketplace
m or the seller does not choose marketplace m.
Now we begin to derive the buyer’s expected utility in marketplace m with bid db (db =
b(b)). Since we consider equilibrium matching policy to match traders, we need to know
the position of the buyer’s bid among all bids in marketplace m, which depends on other
buyers’ bids. Speciﬁcally, we use
b(x;y;db) =
B   1
x;y



hb
m(db)
x


eb
m(db)
y


1   hb
m(db)   eb
m(db)
B 1 x y
(12)
to calculate the probability that in marketplace m, there are exactly x buyers’ bids strictly
higher than db, exactly y buyers’ bids tying with db (excluding the buyer for which we are
calculating the expected utility), and exactly B   1   x   y buyers’ bids strictly less than db
or not choosing marketplace m. In this situation, the buyer’s position in marketplace m, v,
can be anywhere between x+1 and x+y+1. We use a tie-breaking rule where each of these
possible positions occurs with equal probability 1=(y + 1). We denote the buyer’s expected
utility given its position v as ˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b;v). Now the expected utility of the
buyer in marketplace m is given by:
˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b) =
B 1 X
x=0
B 1 x X
y=0
b(x;y;db) 
1
y + 1

x+y+1 X
v=x+1
˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b;v)   rm (13)
where rm is the registration fee charged to the buyer when it enters the marketplace m. We
now calculate the buyer’s expected utility when its bid is v-th highest among all bids in
marketplace m, which is given by:
˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b;v) =
X
ds2Ds:dsdb
˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b;v;ds) (14)13
where ˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b;v;ds) is the buyer’s expected utility when it attempts to be
matched with the ask ds, which is given by:
˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b;v;ds) =
v 1 X
r=0
S r X
t=v r
s(r;t;ds)  ˜ Ub
mjds( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b;v)
(15)
where
s(r;t;ds) =
 S
r;t



hs
m(ds)
r


es
m(ds)
t


1   hs
m(ds)   es
m(ds)
S r t
(16)
is the probability that there are exactly r asks strictly less than ds and exactly t asks equal to
ds (including the ask itself). Note that t should be at least equal to v   r in Equation 15, and
thus
v 1 P
r=0
S r P
t=v r
s(r;t;ds) actually gives the overall probability that the bid db is matched with
the ask ds. Finally, ˜ Ub
mjds( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b;v) is the buyer’s expected utility when it is
matched with the ask ds. This is given by:
˜ Ub
mjds( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b;v) = b   db + (db   TP)  (1   qm) (17)
where TP = ds  km + db  (1   km) is the transaction price, and db   TP is the buyer’s
observed proﬁt, and qm is the proﬁt fee charged to traders.
The above equation gives the expected utility of the buyer in a particular marketplace.
Therefore, a buyer’s expected utility over all marketplaces in the fee system ¯ P is:
˜ Ub( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b) =
M X
m=1
!b(b;m; ¯ P)  ˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b) (18)
After deriving traders’ expected utilities, in the next section, we will use EGT to analyse
the equilibrium market selection strategies of traders.
4.2 An Evolutionary Analysis of Market Selection Strategies
We now use the equations from the previous section together with EGT to analyse the
traders’ equilibrium market selection strategies for a given fee system ¯ P = hp1;:::; pMi.
Speciﬁcally, we will use replicator dynamics to computationally determine the equilibrium
strategies. Replicator dynamics is used in evolutionary game theory (EGT) to control the
learning process, in which players gradually adjust their strategies over time in response to
the repeated observation of their opponents’ strategies. In the following section, we will de-
scribe the replicator dynamics equations, which capture the dynamics of how traders evolv-
ing to equilibrium market selection strategies, and then give the evolutionary analysis in
detail. Before doing these, we ﬁrst detail the assumptions used in our analysis.
Firstly, since we focus on market selection strategies, we assume that traders adopt a
ﬁxed bid factor for the ray bidding strategy during the analysis.8 Furthermore, we assume
that there are only two types of buyers and two types of sellers:9 rich and poor, which are
denoted by b
2 and b
1 respectively for buyers, and s
1 and s
2 for sellers, i.e. B = fb
1;b
2g
8 In the future, we would like to analyse how traders evolve to the equilibrium ray bidding strategies.
9 Although we only consider two types of traders, our general framework indeed allows the analysis of more types
of traders. However, introducing more types will signiﬁcantly increase the number of possible starting points as well as the
number of replicator dynamics equations, making the computation intractable. Therefore, here we consider 2 types of traders.14
and S = fs
1;s
2g. A rich buyer is deﬁned as having a higher limit price than a poor buyer,
i.e. b
2 > b
1, and a rich seller is deﬁned as having a lower cost price than a poor seller,
i.e. s
1 < s
2. Trader types are independently drawn with an equal probability (i.e. f b(b
1) =
f b(b
2) = 0:5 and f s(s
1) = f s(s
2) = 0:5). Furthermore, in this paper, we assume that rich
buyers and rich sellers have the same evolutionary behaviour and poor buyers and poor
sellers have the same evolutionary behaviour.10 Therefore, during the evolutionary process,
rich(poor) buyers should have the same expected utility as rich(poor) sellers. In order to
reasonably make this assumption, rich(poor) buyers and rich(poor) sellers should be treated
equally by marketplaces. Thus we assume pricing parameter km = 0:5, i.e. the transaction
price is set in the middle of oers of the matched buyers and sellers, which means that
the marketplaces have no bias in favor of buyers or sellers when allocating trading proﬁts.
Furthermore, we should assume that the proﬁts of buyers and sellers are symmetric and
therefore, as an example, we let b
1 = 4, b
2 = 6, s
1 = 0 and s
2 = 2, and all traders adopt
the same bid factor in the ray bidding strategy. Furthermore, in our system, we assume that
the highest allowed oer is 6 (i.e. ¯ A = 6) and the lowest allowed oer is 0 (i.e. A = 0).
In addition, we assume that there are equal numbers of buyers and sellers. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that there are 5 buyers and 5 sellers.11
4.2.1 Replicator Dynamics
The replicator dynamics equations specify the dynamic adjustment of the probability with
whichpurestrategyshouldbeplayed(forexample,inPhelpsetal,2010,replicatordynamics
areusedtoshowhowtradersbidinadoubleauctionmarketplace).Sinceweassumethatrich
buyers and rich sellers have the same learning behaviour, and poor buyers and poor sellers
have the same learning behaviour, in this work, we have 2 populations (i.e. rich traders and
poor traders). We ﬁrst introduce the 2-population replicator dynamics equations which show
the dynamic changes of traders’ market selection strategies with respect to time t. Note that
here a time step corresponds to an evolutionary step.
˙ !b(b
1;m; ¯ P) = ˙ !s(s
2;m; ¯ P) =
d!b(b
1;m; ¯ P)
dt
=

˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b
1)   ˜ Ub( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b
1)

 !b(b
1;m; ¯ P) (19)
˙ !b(b
2;m; ¯ P) = ˙ !s(s
1;m; ¯ P) =
d!b(b
2;m; ¯ P)
dt
=

˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b
2)   ˜ Ub( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b
2)

 !b(b
2;m; ¯ P) (20)
As an example, ˙ !b(b
1;m; ¯ P) describes how the poor buyer with type b
1 changes its prob-
ability of choosing marketplace m in the fee system ¯ P. Here, ˜ Ub
m( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);b
1) is
the poor buyer’s expected utility when it chooses marketplace m, and ˜ Ub( ¯ P; ¯ K; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P);
b
1) is the poor buyer’s overall expected utility (see Subsection 4.1). In order to get the dy-
namics of the strategies, we need to calculate trajectories, which indicate how the mixed
strategies evolve. In more detail, initially, a mixed strategy is chosen as a starting point (in
our results, we experiment with a large number of such points). The dynamics are then cal-
culated according to the above replicator equations. According to the dynamic changes of
10 In Shi et al (2010b), we also ran experiments considering that rich(poor) buyers and rich(poor) sellers have dierent
behaviour. However, we found that results are broadly similar, and so we do not present them in this paper.
11 In the experimental analysis, we also ran experiments with more buyers and more sellers. However, the results with
higher number of traders are similar and so are not included here.15
traders’ strategies, their current mixed strategies can be calculated. Such calculations are re-
peated until ˙ !b() becomes zero, at which point the equilibrium for the replicator dynamics
is reached (which is also called the rest point for the replicator dynamics). If the equilibrium
for the replicator dynamics is asymptotically stable, then this equilibrium is a Nash equilib-
rium.12 When considering traders evolving from all possible starting points, we get several
regions. The region from which all trajectories converge to a particular equilibrium is called
the basin of attraction of this equilibrium. The basin is very useful since, given the assump-
tion that each starting point is selected by traders with an equal probability, its size can be
used as an indicator of the probability of traders converging to that equilibrium (Tuyls and
Parsons, 2007).
4.2.2 Experimental Results
After providing replicator dynamics equations, we now analyse the equilibrium market
selection strategies for traders. We ﬁrst consider 2 competing marketplaces, and in Sec-
tion 4.2.4, we will extend the analysis to more marketplaces. Note that, in our framework,
traders’ market selection strategies are conditional on the fee system and we consider both
registration and proﬁt fees. Therefore, in the following, we analyse the equilibrium market
selection strategies in dierent cases where marketplaces charge each possible type of fee.
Both marketplaces only charging proﬁt fees:
We ﬁrst analyse the equilibrium market selection strategies when both marketplaces only
charge proﬁt fees. In this case, traders will always choose one of the marketplaces since
traders have non-negative proﬁts when participating. As an illustrative example, we assume
that marketplace 1 charges 20% proﬁt fee and marketplace 2 charges 30% proﬁt fee. For the
bid factor of traders’ ray bidding strategies, we ﬁrst assume that ab = as = 1, i.e. traders bid
truthfully. Then the dynamic results for dierent starting points are shown in Figure 1(a),
where the x-axis is the rich buyer(seller)’s probability of choosing market 1, and the y-axis
is the poor buyer(seller)’s probability of choosing marketplace 1. We ﬁnd that all traders
either converge to BNE 1 (i.e. marketplace 1) or BNE 2 (i.e. marketplace 2) depending on
the initial conditions. The ﬁgure also shows that the basin of attraction to BNE 1 is bigger.
This means that, (assuming each starting point has an equal probability) since marketplace
1 charges less, traders have a higher probability of converging to marketplace 1.
For the same setting, we now analyse how equilibrium market selection strategies are
changed when traders can shade their oers. Speciﬁcally, we assume that ab = as = 0:8.
Now the evolutionary results are shown in Figure 1(b), from which we can see that traders
still converge to marketplace 1 or marketplace 2 in equilibrium. However, comparing Figure
1(b) with Figure 1(a), we can see that traders have a slightly higher probability of choosing
marketplace 2 when traders can shade their oers than when traders bid truthfully. This is
because, when traders shade their oers, their absolute payments incurred by proﬁt fees are
reduced since the observed proﬁts are reduced, and therefore traders are less sensitive to the
dierence of the two marketplaces’ proﬁt fees. Therefore, in Figure 1(b), traders only have
a slightly higher probability of choosing marketplace 1 than that of choosing marketplace 2.
From Figures 1(a) and 1(b), we can furthermore see that two competing marketplaces never
co-exist in equilibrium. Similar results are obtained with dierent combinations of proﬁts
12 An equilibrium in replicator dynamics is asymptotically stable if: a) any solution path of the replicator dynamics re-
mains arbitrarily close to the equilibrium if it starts suciently close to it; b) any solution path of the replicator dynamics
converges to the equilibrium if it starts close enough to it (Tuyls and Parsons, 2007). In Redondo (2003), it is proved that if
an equilibrium of the replicator dynamics is asymptotically stable, then it is a Nash equilibrium.16
BNE 2
BNE 1
(a) Traders bid truthfully, i.e. ab = as = 1.
BNE 2
BNE 1
(b) Traders shade their oers with ab = as = 0:8.
Fig. 1: Evolutionary process of market selection strategies when marketplace 1 charges 20%
proﬁt fee and 2 charges 30% proﬁt fee. The dotted line denotes the boundary between the
basins of attractions.
fees charged by marketplaces (see the experimental results in Figures 16 and 17 in Appendix
A, in which we use the dierent gray levels to indicate the probability of traders choosing
each marketplace in equilibrium). This shows that, in our framework, the positive network
eect (where traders prefer marketplaces with a larger number of traders on the other side)
has a larger impact than the negative network eect (where traders prefer marketplaces with
fewer other traders on the same side), which will cause traders to converge to one market-
place in equilibrium.
Both marketplaces only charging registration fees:
We now extend the above analysis to the case where both competing marketplaces only
charge registration fees. In this case, we should note that traders may not choose any mar-
ketplaces since their expected proﬁts may be negative. Therefore, now there are three pure17
market selection strategies for traders, i.e. choosing marketplace 1, choosing marketplace 2,
and choosing no marketplace. As a result, we cannot show the evolutionary results from all
starting points in a 2-dimension graph, and instead, in the following, in this section we show
the evolutionary process from a single starting point as an example. However, in Appendix
A, we indeed show the results from other starting points and other possible registration fees.
We ﬁrst assume that traders bid truthfully, i.e. ab = as = 1. Figure 2(a) shows the evolution-
ary process when marketplace 1 charges a 0.5 registration fee, and marketplace 2 charges
a 0.8 registration fee. Recall that time corresponds to evolutionary steps. From this we can
see that all traders converge to marketplace 1, which is the cheaper one. However, when
marketplace 1 charges a 1.5 registration fee, and marketplace 2 charges a 1.8 registration
fee, from Figure 2(b), we can see that rich traders will converge to marketplace 1, and poor
traders will not choose any marketplace because high registration fees cause negative proﬁts
for them. We ﬁnd similar results when running experiments from other starting points and
dierent combinations of registration fees. That is, traders always choose either the same
marketplace or no marketplace, and never distribute in two competing marketplaces. These
results for dierent settings are shown in Figures 18 and 19 in Appendix A. Furthermore, we
run experiments by considering that traders shade their oers. We ﬁnd that the bid factors do
not aect the traders’ market selection strategies signiﬁcantly since the absolute payments
incurred from registration fees are not aected by shading. Therefore, the conclusions are
similar to the case where traders bid truthfully.
Marketplace 1 charging a proﬁt fee and marketplace 2 charging a registration fee:
In reality, it also happens that dierent marketplaces charge dierent types of fees. We now
analyse traders’ equilibrium market selection strategies in this situation. Speciﬁcally, we as-
sume that marketplace 1 charges a proﬁt fee, and marketplace 2 charges a registration fee.
In this situation, traders will always choose one of the marketplaces (since at least market-
place 2 can guarantee non-negative proﬁts for them). We ﬁnd that for some fee systems,13
when evolving from some starting points, traders may converge to dierent marketplaces in
equilibrium. As an illustrative example, we assume that marketplace 1 charges 70% proﬁt
fee and marketplace 2 charges 0.8 registration fee, and traders bid truthfully. The results are
shown in Figure 3(a). We ﬁnd that, in this case, in addition to BNE 1 and BNE 2, there exists
a third equilibrium (BNE 3), where rich traders converge to marketplace 1 which charges
a registration fee, and poor traders converge to marketplace 2 which charges a proﬁt fee.
At this moment, two competing marketplaces co-exist. In contrast to Ellison et al (2004),
where co-existence of competing marketplaces is caused by negative network eects, here
the co-existence is caused by the strong dierentiation of competing marketplaces by set-
ting dierent types of fees. In more detail, rich traders prefer the marketplace charging a
lump sum fee since this fee is smaller than the absolute payment incurred from charging
proﬁt fees on a large observed proﬁt. However, poor traders prefer the marketplace which
charges a proﬁt fee, since this can guarantee non-negative proﬁts for them, and a high reg-
istration fee may lead to negative proﬁts.14 Similarly, the same phenomenon is observed
when traders shade their oers. As an example, Figure 3(b) shows the evolutionary results
13 Speciﬁcally, in this experimental setting, the proﬁt fee of marketplace 1 is higher than 10%, and the registration fee of
marketplace 2 is higher than 0.4.
14 Forexample,forthestartingpointsthatrichtraderschoosemarketplace1and2withprobability0.3and0.7respectively,
andpoor traderschoose marketplace1 and2 withprobability 0.8and0.2 respectively,when marketplace1 charges50% proﬁt
fee and marketplace 2 charges 0.8 registration fee, the expected payment for rich traders in marketplace 1 is 1.17, which is
higher than that in marketplace 2, which is 0.8. Therefore, rich traders prefer marketplace 2. In contrast, the expected payment
of poor traders in marketplace 1 is 0.45, which is smaller than that in marketplace 2, which is 0.8. Then poor traders prefer
marketplace 1.18
t
(a) Marketplace 1 charges a 0.5 registration fee, and marketplace 2 charges a 0.8
registration fee.
t
(b) Marketplace 1 charges a 1.5 registration fee, and marketplace 2 charges a 1.8
registration fee.
Fig. 2: Evolutionary process of market selection strategies when both competing market-
places charge registration fees, and initially rich traders choose marketplace 1, 2 and no
marketplace with probability 0.48, 0.46 and 0.06 respectively, and poor traders choose mar-
ketplace 1, 2 and no marketplace with probability 0.46, 0.48 and 0.06 respectively. Traders
bid truthfully, i.e. ab = as = 1.
when ab = as = 0:8. We can see that when evolving from some starting points, rich traders
will converge to marketplace 2 charging a registration fee, and poor traders will converge to
marketplace 1 charging a proﬁt fee, i.e. two competing marketplaces can co-exist. However,
since traders can shade oers, and thus the payments incurred by proﬁt fees are reduced,
comparing Figure 3(a) with Figure 3(b), we can see that traders have a higher probability of
choosing the marketplace charging a proﬁt fee (i.e. BNE 1). Thus, as traders shade, the basin
of attraction of marketplace 1 becomes larger. Experimental results using dierent registra-
tion and proﬁt fees are shown in Figures 20, 21, 22 and 23 in Appendix A. In all of these
cases, we still ﬁnd the same conclusions, where dierent types of traders may converge to19
BNE 2
BNE 1 BNE 3
(a) Traders bid truthfully, i.e. ab = as = 1.
BNE 2
BNE 1 BNE 3
(b) Traders shade their oers with ab = as = 0:8.
Fig. 3: Evolutionary process of market selection strategies when marketplace 1 charges 70%
proﬁt fee and marketplace 2 charges 0.8 registration fee. The dotted line denotes the bound-
ary between the basins of attractions.
dierent marketplaces in equilibrium, and when traders shade, they prefer to choose mar-
ketplace 1 charging a proﬁt fee.
Both marketplaces charging combinations of registration and proﬁt fees:
We now extend the above analysis to the more general case that both competing market-
places can charge a combination of registration and proﬁt fees. In this case, we ﬁnd that
traders may converge to the same marketplace, or may not choose any marketplace, or dif-
ferent types of traders may converge to dierent marketplaces. For example, we assume that
traders bid truthfully, and marketplace 1 charges 0.1 registration fee and 50% proﬁt fee, and
marketplace 2 charges 0.8 registration fee and 10% proﬁt fee. The evolutionary process of
traders evolving from a speciﬁc starting point is shown in Figure 4. From this ﬁgure, we can
see that rich traders converge to marketplace 2 which charges a higher registration fee and a20
t
Fig. 4: Evolutionary process of market selection strategies when marketplace 1 charges 0.1
registration fee and 50% proﬁt fee, marketplace 2 charges 0.8 registration fee and 10% proﬁt
fee, and initially rich traders choose marketplace 1, 2 and no marketplace with probability
0.35, 0.6 and 0.05 respectively, and poor traders choose marketplace 1, 2 and no marketplace
with probability 0.45, 0.52 and 0.03 respectively. Traders bid truthfully, i.e. ab = as = 1.
lower proﬁt fee, and poor traders converge to marketplace 1 which charges a lower registra-
tion fee and a higher proﬁt fee. When exploring other fee systems (see Figures 24 and 25),
we still can ﬁnd the similar conclusions, where depending on the initial starting points and
fees, traders may converge to the same marketplace (or choose no marketplace), or dier-
ent types of traders may converge to dierent marketplaces. Furthermore, when traders can
shade their oers, we still ﬁnd the similar conclusions.
4.2.3 Lock-in Region
In the above analysis, we can see that, due to network eects, when evolving from cer-
tain starting points, traders may converge to the expensive marketplace in equilibrium (for
example, in Figure 1(a), we can see that traders may converge to marketplace 2 in equi-
librium). This is interesting since it means that the marketplace can charge higher fees to
make more proﬁts but still keep traders (even if the size of the basin of attraction is smaller
when fees are relatively higher). In the following, we analyse this in detail. In doing so, we
consider proﬁt fees as an example. Since we consider a ﬁnite set of fees in our framework,
we discretize the continuous proﬁt fees of the marketplaces. Speciﬁcally, we discretize the
continuous proﬁt fee from 0 and 1 with a step size of 0.1. Clearly, the traders’ evolution
of their market selection strategies depends on two factors: the starting point and the fees
charged to them. We now choose a starting point where rich traders choose marketplace 1
and 2 with probability 0.8 and 0.2 respectively, and poor traders choose marketplace 1 and
2 with probability 0.7 and 0.3 respectively (i.e. traders initially have a higher probability of
choosing marketplace 1). We also assume that traders bid truthfully (in the following, we
will analyse this when traders can shade their oers). Figure 5 then shows the results after
we evolve the traders’ market selection strategies in the competing marketplaces with dif-
ferent proﬁt fees. The shaded area is what we call the “lock-in region”, which shows when
proﬁt fees of marketplace 1 and 2 are within this area, traders converge to marketplace 1,
even though marketplace 1 charges a higher proﬁt fee than marketplace 2. This result shows
that, the expensive marketplace can make more proﬁts while still maintaining traders. Note21
Fig. 5: Lock-in region when rich traders choose marketplace 1 and 2 with probability 0.8
and 0.2 respectively, and poor traders choose marketplace 1 and 2 with probability 0.7 and
0.3 respectively. Traders bid truthfully, i.e. ab = as = 1.
that, when the proﬁt fee of marketplace 2 is higher than 60%, marketplace 1 can no longer
maintain traders if its proﬁt fee is higher than marketplace 2, i.e. the lock-in region disap-
pears. We ﬁnd similar lock-in regions when both competing marketplaces charge registra-
tion fees, charge dierent types of fees, or charge combinations of proﬁt and registration
fees. Now we can see that it is possible for traders to converge to the expensive market-
place if currently traders have higher probabilities of choosing this marketplace. This result
gives useful insights into a strategy for setting fees in competing marketplaces. Speciﬁcally,
ﬁrstly, a marketplace should lower its fees to attract or maintain traders. After obtaining an
advantageous position, the marketplace should then increase its fees higher than its oppo-
nents, while still keeping its traders since traders still have higher expected utilities in the
expensive marketplace. This so-called bait-and-switch strategy has been adopted by a num-
ber of entrants in the CAT competition (Niu et al, 2008), where initially they charge lower
and even no fees to attract traders, and once they have built up a larger market share, they
will charge fees to make proﬁts, but still can maintain market share at a good level. While
such a strategy is quite intuitive and common in many marketplaces, our analysis provides a
more formal justiﬁcation for it. Furthermore, we can use the strategy as an indication of the
level at which the fees should be set.
We now consider how the bid factor aects the size of the lock-in region when both
marketplaces only charge proﬁt fees. First, we calculate the size of the lock-in region as the
sum of the dierences of two marketplaces’ discretized proﬁt fees in the lock-in region. For
example, the size of the lock-in region in Figure 5 is 1.2.15 We consider the same starting
point as the above analysis. For the ray bidding strategy, we assume that the bid factor is in
the range of 0.75 to 1.16 The relationship between the bid factor and the size of the lock-in
15 This is the sum of discretized proﬁt fee dierence of two marketplaces: (0:3 0:0)+(0:3 0:1)+(0:4 0:2)+(0:5 0:3)+
(0:5 0:4)+(0:6 0:5)+(0:7 0:6). Note that the size of the lock-in region is only meaningful when competing marketplaces
charge the same type of fees. It makes no sense when dierent types of fees are charged since they have dierent scales.
Therefore, in the analysis of the lock-in region, we only look at the cases where marketplaces charge the same type of fees.
16 When ab = as = 0:75, rich buyers will bid 4.5, poor buyers will bid 3, rich sellers will ask 1.5 and poor sellers will
ask 3. When a symmetric demand and supply is considered, poor traders still can trade. However, when ab = as < 0:75, i.e.
traders shade their oers more, poor traders will not be able to trade, which is irrational and they will not shade their oers
at this degree. Therefore, we consider that bid factor is in the range of 0.75 to 1.22
Fig. 6: Relationship between the bid factor and the size of lock-in region.
region is shown in Figure 6, from which, we can see that, when the bid factor decreases (i.e.
traders shade more), the size of the lock-in region increases. This is because, when traders
shade more, the absolute payments incurred from proﬁt fees are smaller, and thus traders are
less sensitive to proﬁt fees, and therefore the size of the lock-in region increases. We also
analyse the relationship between the bid factor and the size of the lock-in region when both
competing marketplaces only charge registration fees. In contrast to the conclusion when
both marketplaces only charge proﬁt fees, we ﬁnd that the bid factor cannot aect the size
of the lock-in region signiﬁcantly since the absolute payments incurred from registration
fees are not aected by the bid factor.
So far, we assumed that traders always evolve from their current market selection strate-
gies. Now we analyse how the lock-in region will be aected when some traders are able to
explore other marketplaces randomly. We do this because, ﬁrst of all, traders usually have
incomplete information about other traders’ market selection decisions. Thus they need to
explore and try dierent marketplaces to obtain more information. This is also why in the
CAT competition a similar strategy is used, where traders use -greedy to randomly explore
marketplaces with a small probability. Secondly, in reality, not all traders are (fully) rational,
i.e. they may not always choose the cheapest marketplace. Thus we consider the case where
some traders randomly select marketplaces. For example, when the randomisation proba-
bility is 10%, then traders will have 90% probability of using their current market selection
strategies and 10% probability of selecting each marketplace with equal probability to ex-
plore other marketplaces. For this setting, we analyse how the probability of randomisation
aects the size of lock-in region. We assume that traders bid truthfully. The relationship
between the randomisation probability and the size of lock-in region is shown in Figure 7.
We can see that, when the probability of randomly selecting marketplace increases, the size
of lock-in region decreases. Furthermore, when the probability of randomly selecting mar-
ketplaces is higher than 70%, the lock-in region disappears completely.17 This means that,
as exploration increases, it is more dicult for the competing marketplace to keep traders
when charging higher fees even though it initially has a larger market share.18 Thus in the
17 Although a very high random exploration probability is unrealistic, here we want to analyse how the randomisation
probability can aect the size of the lock-in region in the extreme case.
18 The same conclusion also holds when both competing marketplaces only charge registration fees.23
Fig. 7: Relationshipbetweentheprobabilityofrandomlyselectingmarketplacesandthesize
of lock-in region.
environment with traders having greater probabilities to explore to search for the cheaper
marketplace, the marketplace with a large market share has only a limited advantage.
4.2.4 Greater Numbers of Competing Marketplaces
So far we have analysed the market selection strategies of traders in the setting with two
competing marketplaces. As stated previously, this analysis is in line with all previous the-
oretical work which has focused on this canonical case, see Section 2. However, in the
real world, it is often the case that more than two marketplaces compete. Now, we expect
that our results will carry over to this more complex setting. Speciﬁcally, when multiple
competing marketplaces only charge the same type of fees (i.e. registration or proﬁt fees),
we expect that traders will still converge to one marketplace in equilibrium. On the other
hand, when multiple competing marketplaces charge dierent types of fees (i.e. some mar-
ketplaces charge proﬁt fees, and others charge registration fees), we believe that traders
will either converge to only one marketplace, or only two marketplaces where one charges
a proﬁt fee and the other charges a registration fee. To explore these hypotheses, we run
experiments with larger numbers of marketplaces. By so doing, we ﬁnd that, consistent
with the previous analysis, when all marketplaces charge proﬁt fees (or registration fees),
traders will converge to one of them in equilibrium.19 Exactly which one depends on the
initial starting point and market fees. Moreover, consistent with the previous analysis, in
such experiments, we also ﬁnd that traders may converge to the expensive marketplace in
equilibrium when this marketplace initially has a larger market share. For example, when
there are three competing marketplaces where marketplaces 1, 2 and 3 charge 10%, 20%
and 30% proﬁt fees respectively, and initially rich traders choose marketplaces 1, 2 and 3
with probabilities 0.1, 0.2 and 0.7 respectively, and poor traders choose marketplaces 1, 2
and 3 with probabilities 0.3, 0.2 and 0.5 respectively, the evolutionary results are shown in
19 This means that multiple marketplaces cannot co-exist when they charge the same type of fees. This conclusion is dif-
ferent from what we observe in practice. We believe that this is because in our model, dierent marketplaces adopt the same
mechanism and have identical goods, and thus cannot provide enough diversity for traders to select dierent marketplaces.
Furthermore, our conclusion is dierent from the result in Cai et al (2008), which showed that in the context of CAT compe-
tition, multiple marketplaces can retain traders when they charge similar fees. We believe that this may be because traders in
the context of CAT competition adopt heuristic market selection strategies, which are dierent from the equilibrium strategies
used in our model, and it may also be caused by the dierences between our model and the context of CAT competition.24
Figure 8(a). From the evolutionary results, we can see that eventually all traders converge
to one marketplace. Speciﬁcally, in this case, traders converge to marketplace 3 which is
the most expensive since initially this marketplace has a larger market share. Furthermore,
when some of them charge registration fees and others charge proﬁt fees, we ﬁnd that traders
either converge to one marketplace in equilibrium or the rich traders converge to the mar-
ketplace which charges a registration fee and the poor traders converge to the marketplace
which charges a proﬁt fee (multiple competing marketplaces which charge the same type of
fees do not co-exist in equilibrium and only one of them can survive). For example, when
there are three competing marketplaces where marketplaces 1 and 2 charge 40% and 50%
proﬁt fees respectively and marketplace 3 charges a 0.8 registration fee, and initially rich
traders choose marketplaces 1, 2 and 3 with probabilities 0.15, 0.2 and 0.65 respectively,
and poor traders choose marketplaces 1, 2 and 3 with probabilities 0.35, 0.25 and 0.4 re-
spectively, the evolutionary results are shown in Figure 8(b). From this ﬁgure, we can see
that eventually rich traders converge to marketplace 3 charging a registration fee, and poor
traders converge to marketplace 1 charging a proﬁt fee. We also can see that marketplaces 1
and 2 charging the same types of fees cannot co-exist, and only marketplace 1 survives. In
these experiments, we assume that traders bid truthfully. However, when traders can shade
their oers, we still ﬁnd the similar conclusions.
5 Equilibrium Analysis of Fee Strategies
In the previous section, we analysed the traders’ equilibrium strategies of market selection
for given fee systems. Now, given insights of the above analysis, we analyse how market-
places should set fees to make proﬁts. That is, we consider the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of
the entire game, including the strategies of the marketplaces. As we said previously, this is a
two-stage game, where in the ﬁrst stage, marketplaces publish their fee structures according
to their (mixed) fee strategies, and in the second stage, traders select marketplaces according
to their market selection strategies, which are conditional on the fee system. However, given
this complicated setting of a two-stage game with incomplete information about traders’
types, it is dicult to use traditional game-theoretic methods to analyse equilibrium fee
strategies. Intuitively, we can see that traders’ market selection strategies and marketplaces’
fee strategies will aect each other. Hence we use a co-evolutionary approach to analyse
this problem. This co-evolutionary approach can capture the dynamic process of how mar-
ketplaces evolve their fee strategies to converge to equilibrium while taking into account the
dynamic changes of the traders’ market selection strategies.20 In the following, before we
perform the co-evolutionary analysis, we ﬁrst describe the co-evolutionary process in detail.
5.1 The Co-Evolutionary Process
In the co-evolutionary process, both competing marketplaces and traders dynamically learn
to adapt their strategies to maximise their own expected utilities. This learning process is
repeated until both traders and marketplaces do not change their strategies. At this moment,
an equilibrium is reached. In each learning round (i.e. a co-evolutionary step), traders update
their expected utilities before they evolve their market selection strategies. Now in order
20 Cli (2002) and Phelps et al (2001) used genetic programming based approaches to analyse traders’ bidding behaviour
and the marketplace’s mechanism in a co-evolutionary way. However, their work focused on isolated marketplaces without
considering competition between them.25
t
(a) Marketplace 1, 2 and 3 charge 10%, 20% and 30% proﬁt fees respectively.
t
(b) Marketplace 1, 2 and 3 charge 40%, 50% proﬁts fees and 0.8 registration fee
respectively.
Fig. 8: Evolutionary process of market selection strategies with 3 competing marketplaces.
Traders bid truthfully, i.e. ab = as = 1.
to calculate the expected utilities, they require information about bid and ask distributions,
which, in turn, depend on the fees charged by the marketplaces as well as the traders’ market
selection strategies. While in Section 4 the bid and ask distributions were calculated for a
given fee system, the strategies of the marketplaces are mixed and therefore in this case we
calculate the distributions based on the composition of the marketplace strategies. However,
we should note that the market selection strategies of traders are still conditional on the
actual fee system announced by the marketplaces. This is important since it creates a link
between the strategy composition of the marketplaces and its eect on the expected utility
of the traders, enabling co-evolution to occur.21
21 An alternative approach is to keep the bid and ask distributions conditional on the fees, but then the population dynamics
of the fee strategies will have no eect on the traders’ expected utilities.26
Fig. 9: The co-evolutionary process.
Now we describe the co-evolutionary process in detail (see Figure 9). First, we initialise
the marketplaces’ fee strategies and the traders’ market selection strategies. Then we calcu-
late the initial bid distribution of buyers and ask distribution of sellers (see Equations 21 and
22 in the following subsection). From the initial bid and ask distributions, traders calculate
their expected utilities, and then evolve their market selection strategies on each possible
fee system. After traders evolve their market selection strategies on each possible fee sys-
tem, competing marketplaces calculate their expected utilities (which depend on the traders’
conditional mixed market selection strategies) and then evolve their fee strategies. After
marketplaces evolve their fee strategies, we update the bid and ask distributions of traders,
and then enter the next co-evolutionary step. This co-evolutionary process proceeds until
all dynamic changes of traders’ market selection strategies and marketplaces’ fee strategies
become zero. At this moment, an equilibrium is reached.
In the following, before giving the experimental analysis in detail, we ﬁrst need to de-
rive equations to calculate the expected utilities of traders and marketplaces, and give the
replicator dynamics equations.
5.2 Expected Utilities of Traders and Marketplaces
As per Section 4, we consider that traders adopt ray bidding strategies and marketplaces use
equilibrium matching policies to match traders. As discussed above, in the co-evolutionary
process, a trader’s expected utility depends on the bid and ask distributions of other traders.
In Subsection 4.1, we calculated the bid and ask distributions for a given fee system. How-
ever, since the fee strategies of the marketplaces are mixed, here we consider traders’ oer
distributions under all allowable fee systems, and therefore need to recalculate them. The
new bid and ask distributions are derived in the following way respectively. First, the prob-
ability of the bid db submitted by a buyer in marketplace m is:
m(db) =
X
¯ P2PM
( ¯ P)  m(dbj ¯ P) (21)
where ( ¯ P) =
Q
m2M m(pm) is the probability of the fee system ¯ P appearing, and m(dbj ¯ P)
the probability of the bid db submitted by a buyer in marketplace m for a given fee system27
¯ P (see Equation 6). The equations for sellers can be recalculated in the same way, which is:
m(ds) =
X
¯ P2PM
( ¯ P)  m(dsj ¯ P) (22)
All other equations to calculate the traders’ expected utilities are the same as before except
that in these equations we need to replace m(dbj ¯ P) and m(dsj ¯ P) (which are conditional on
a speciﬁc fee system ¯ P) by m(db) and m(ds) (which are under all possible fee systems)
respectively.
In addition to the traders’ utilities, in this two-stage game, we also calculate the expected
utility of each marketplace. Intuitively, a marketplace’s expected utility not only depends on
its own fee strategy, but also on fee strategies of other marketplaces and the number of dif-
ferent bids and asks in it. In the following, we calculate the expected utility of marketplace
m given a fee strategy proﬁle ¯ , and market selection strategy proﬁles of buyers and sell-
ers, ¯ !b() and ¯ !s(), when traders adopt ray bidding strategies. In the ﬁrst step, we need to
calculate the marketplace’s expected utility with a fee structure pm. In order to do this, we
calculate the marketplace’s expected utility when the fee system is ¯ P satisfying pm = ¯ P(m),
given market selection strategy proﬁles of buyers and sellers, ¯ !b( ¯ P) and ¯ !s( ¯ P). Since the
marketplace’s expected utility also depends on the bids and asks in this marketplace, we
ﬁrst use a jDbj-tuple ¯ xb = hxb
1;:::; xb
jDbji 2 Xb,
jDbj P
i=1
xb
i  B, to represent the number of dif-
ferent bids in marketplace m, where xb
i is the number of buyers submitting bid db
i 2 Db
in marketplace m (note that this is also the number of buyers having type b and choosing
marketplace m where db
i = b(b)), and Xb is the set of all such possible tuples. Similarly,
we use a jDsj-tuple ¯ xs = hxs
1;:::; xs
jDsji 2 Xs to represent the number of dierent asks in
marketplace m. Now given the number of dierent bids and asks in marketplace m, mar-
ketplace m’s expected utility is calculated as follows. Since marketplace m uses equilibrium
matching to match traders, we ﬁrst sort the bids descendingly and asks ascendingly in mar-
ketplace m, and then match high bids with low asks. Speciﬁcally, we assume that there are
T transactions in total in marketplace m, and in transaction t, we use TPt, b
t and s
t to
represent the transaction price, the buyer’s observed proﬁt, and the seller’s observed proﬁt
respectively. These can be easily calculated. For example, for a transaction made by buyer
with bid db
t and seller with ask ds
t, the transaction price is TPt = ds
t  km + db
t  (1   km), the
buyer’s observed proﬁt is b
t = db
t   TPt = (db
t   ds
t)  km, and the seller’s observed proﬁt is
s
t = TPt   ds
t = (db
t   ds
t)  (1   km). The marketplace’s utility is:
Um( ¯ P; ¯ xb; ¯ xs) =
jDbj X
i=1
xb
i  rm +
jDsj X
i=1
xs
i  rm +
T X
t=1
(b
t  qm + s
t  qm) (23)
where the former two parts are proﬁts from charging registration fees to buyers and sellers
respectively, and the last part is the proﬁt from charging proﬁt fees.
Now we have obtained the marketplace’s expected utility given the number of dierent
bids and asks, ¯ xb and ¯ xs. Furthermore, the probability of ¯ xb appearing given market selection
strategy proﬁles of buyers and sellers in the fee system ¯ P, ¯ !b( ¯ P) and ¯ !s( ¯ P), is:
%b
m(¯ xb; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P)) =
0
B B B B B B @
B
xb
1;:::; xb
jDbj
1
C C C C C C A 
jDbj Y
i=1

m(db
i j ¯ P)
xb
i


1  
jDbj X
i=1
m(db
i j ¯ P)
B 
jDbj P
i=1
xb
i
(24)28
Recall that m(db
i j ¯ P) is the probability of a buyer submitting bid db
i in marketplace m given
the fee system ¯ P. The probability of ¯ xs appearing is:
%s
m(¯ xs; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P)) =
0
B B B B B B @
S
xs
1;:::; xs
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1
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jDsj Y
i=1

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
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i
(25)
At this moment, we can get the marketplace’s expected utility in the fee system ¯ P:
˜ Um

¯ P; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P)

=
X
¯ xb2Xb
X
¯ xs2Xs
%b
m

¯ xb; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P)

%s
m

¯ xs; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P)

Um( ¯ P; ¯ xb; ¯ xs)
(26)
Then the marketplace’s expected utility when its fee structure is pm is as follows:
˜ Um(pm; m()) =
X
¯ P2PM: pm= ¯ P(m)
Y
l2Mnfmg
l

¯ P(l)

 ˜ Um

¯ P; ¯ !b( ¯ P); ¯ !s( ¯ P)

(27)
Then the marketplace m’s expected utility with a fee strategy proﬁle ¯  is:
˜ Um(¯ ) =
X
pm2P
m(pm)  ˜ Um

pm; m()

(28)
5.3 Replicator Dynamics
We now describe the replicator dynamics equations for traders and marketplaces respec-
tively for the two-stage game. In addition to adding the replicator dynamics equations for
the marketplaces, the two-stage game also requires a considerable increase in the number
of equations for the traders. This is because, while in Section 4.2, the equations were for a
given fee system, these are now conditional on the fee system, and a dierent population
of traders evolves for each possible fee system. Speciﬁcally, when the fee system is ¯ P, the
replicator dynamics equations of each type of trader are given by Equations 19 and 20. Since
there are jPMj dierent fee systems, for each type of trader in each marketplace, there are
jPMj replicator equations. Then in our system considering 2 types of traders (rich and poor),
in total, there are jPMj  M  2 replicator equations for traders.
Now we describe replicator dynamics equations for the marketplaces. Since there are jPj
allowable fee structures, for each marketplace, there are jPj replicator dynamics equations
for its fee strategy. In total there are MjPj replicator dynamics equations for marketplaces.
Speciﬁcally, marketplace m’s replicator dynamics equation for fee structure pm is as follows:
˙ m(pm) =
dm(pm)
dt
=

˜ Um

pm; m()

  ˜ Um(¯ )

 m(pm) (29)
where ˙ m(pm) describes how the marketplace m changes its probability of choosing fee
structure pm, ˜ Um

pm; m()

isthemarketplacem’sexpectedutilityofchoosingfeestructure
pm, and ˜ Um(¯ ) is the marketplace m’s overall expected utility as derived in Section 5.2.29
5.4 Experimental Results
After describing the co-evolutionary process and the replicator dynamics equations, we are
ready to analyse how marketplaces evolve their fee strategies over time. Since our frame-
work only considers a ﬁnite set of fees, speciﬁcally, we discretize the proﬁt and registration
fees from 0 to 1 with step size 0.1. In the following analysis, we assume that there are 2
competing marketplaces, and other assumptions are the same as those in Section 4.2. In ad-
dition, unless mentioned otherwise, we assume that traders bid truthfully.22 We now analyse
marketplaces’ equilibrium fee strategies from dierent initial conditions. We ﬁrst consider
that both marketplaces can only charge the same type of fees (we choose proﬁt fees as an
example).Wethenextendtheanalysistothecasewheredierenttypesoffeesareallowed.23
Two identical marketplaces initially having the same fee strategy:
First, we consider that both marketplaces only charge proﬁt fees. Then there are 11 possible
fee structures24 for each marketplace, which implies that there are 484 replicator dynam-
ics equations for the traders and 22 replicator dynamics equations for the two competing
marketplaces. We assume that initially both marketplaces are identical. That is, they have
the same probabilities of choosing each fee structure, and for each fee system, the initial
probability of traders choosing marketplace 1(2) is the ratio of proﬁt fee of marketplace
2(1) to the sum of proﬁt fees of both competing marketplaces (this means that traders have
higher initial probabilities of choosing the cheaper marketplace). Then the initial probability
of traders choosing each marketplace under all possible fee systems is equal, i.e. 0.5. From
this setting, we evolve the fee strategies of marketplaces and the market selection strategies
of the traders. The evolutionary process of fee strategies is shown in Figure 10. Note that,
in this case, two initially identical marketplaces have the same evolutionary process. From
the ﬁgure, we can see that during the evolutionary process, both marketplaces gradually set
low fees with higher probability, and after 500 evolutionary steps, both marketplaces begin
to converge to charge 10% proﬁt fee. In equilibrium, we can see that both marketplaces set
10% proﬁt fee with 100% probability. This is because two identical marketplaces have to
undercut each other by decreasing fees to attract traders. Eventually, they converge to 10%
proﬁt fee, which is the minimum allowed proﬁt fee which can guarantee positive proﬁt for
marketplaces.25 In addition, for the traders’ evolutionary process, we look at the traders’
probability of choosing marketplace 1 considering all possible fee systems. In this case, the
probability of traders choosing each marketplace is unchanged, which is 0.5. This shows that
in a severely competitive environment, competing marketplaces have to charge the lowest
fees, and even no fees, in order to keep traders. When we consider the case where traders can
shade their oers, we still ﬁnd that eventually marketplaces charge the minimum allowed
proﬁt fee (i.e. 10% proﬁt fee in this setting). Furthermore, when both marketplaces initially
have the same fee strategy only charging registration fees, we ﬁnd that both marketplaces
charge 0.1 registration fee in equilibrium.
In the previous analysis (see Section 4.2.2), we introduced randomisation for the traders’
market selection strategies to analyse the eect of exploration and bounded rationality. Now
22 The equilibrium analysis in the cases where traders shade their oers is similar.
23 In the analysis of marketplaces’ fee strategies, in order to reduce the fee system space, we assume that each marketplace
can only charge one type of fees. We believe that our conclusions based on this assumption are still valid in the general cases.
In the future work, we would like to demonstrate this by considering that marketplaces can charge arbitrary combinations of
fees.
24 They are (0,0), (0,0.1), (0,0.2), (0,0.3), (0,0.4), (0,0.5), (0,0.6), (0,0.7), (0,0.8), (0,0.9), (0,1.0).
25 If a lower minimal proﬁt fee would have been allowed, e.g. 1%, then both competing marketplaces will converge to this
lower proﬁt fee.30
Fig. 10: Evolutionary process of fee strategies of marketplace 1 and 2 when they have iden-
tical initial fee strategies.
Fig. 11: Equilibrium fee strategies of marketplace 1 and 2 with respect to randomisation of
market selection when two competing marketplaces have identical initial fee strategies.
we do the same for the above co-evolutionary setting. We also consider a big range of ran-
dom exploration probability (from 0 to 100%–the extreme case), and in doing so, we ﬁnd
that, as the probability of traders randomly choosing marketplaces increases, in equilibrium,
feesincrease.Forexample,whenweintroduce20%randomisation,theninequilibrium,both
marketplaces will charge 20% proﬁt fee. The result is shown in Figure 11. From this, we can
see when randomisation reaches above 50%, in equilibrium, marketplaces charge very high
fees. Especially, when the randomisation reaches 100%, both marketplaces charge 100%
proﬁt fee. This is because two identical competing marketplaces have the same evolutionary
process, and thus they cannot attract traders from each other. When traders have probabil-
ities of randomly choosing marketplace, both marketplaces will ﬁnd that even though they
charge higher fees, they still keep traders. Thus marketplaces will charge higher fees to make
more proﬁts.31
(a) Fee strategy of marketplace 1. (b) Traders’ probability of choosing marketplace 1.
Fig. 12: Evolutionary process of fee strategy of marketplace 1 and traders’ probability of
choosing marketplace 1 when marketplace 1 adopts an adaptivefee strategy and marketplace
2 adopts a ﬁxed fee strategy.
Two dierent marketplaces having an adaptive fee strategy and a ﬁxed fee strategy
respectively:
We now extend the above analysis to more general cases. In the real world, some market-
places may adopt a ﬁxed fee strategy, which means that they will not change fees during a
speciﬁc time. To consider this situation, we now analyse how a marketplace with an adap-
tive fee strategy competes with a marketplace with a ﬁxed fee strategy. As an example, we
assume that marketplace 2 ﬁxes its proﬁt fee at 30%, and marketplace 1 evolves its fee strat-
egy and initially marketplace 1 is slightly more expensive than marketplace 2. Therefore,
marketplace 1 is slightly disadvantaged in terms of traders’ probability of choosing mar-
ketplaces. The evolutionary process of the fee strategy of marketplace 1 is shown in Figure
12(a), and the dynamic changes of traders’ probability of choosing marketplace 1 for this
setting are shown in Figure 12(b). From these ﬁgures we can see that, initially, marketplace
1 decreases its fee (i.e. sets low fees with higher probabilities), and when it has attracted
all the traders, it will increase its fee (i.e. set high fees with higher probabilities), but still
keep traders. In equilibrium, marketplace 1 will charge 70% proﬁt fee. This is because the
proﬁt fees of both competing marketplaces are within the lock-in region, and therefore mar-
ketplace 1 can keep traders even though it is more expensive. However, if in the beginning
marketplace 1 is much more expensive than marketplace 2 (which means that marketplace
2 has a very large lock-in region), then even though marketplace 1 charges a very low fee, it
still fails to attract traders. Therefore, if both marketplaces have similar initial fee strategies,
then the marketplace using an adaptive fee strategy can beat the marketplace using a ﬁxed
fee strategy. However, when a marketplace initially has a large market share, it is dicult for
a new marketplace to obtain market share, even when undercutting its competitors. We then
run experiments by considering that both competing marketplaces only charge registration
fees, we still ﬁnd the similar results.
Two dierent marketplaces having adaptive fee strategies:
In the above, we ﬁnd that an initially disadvantaged marketplace with an adaptive fee strat-
egy can beat the advantaged one with a ﬁxed fee strategy. Now we consider a more com-
plicated case where both competing marketplaces can evolve their fee strategies. We want32
to analyse whether the initially disadvantaged marketplace can beat the advantaged one.
For example, we assume that initially marketplace 2 is slightly cheaper than marketplace 1,
and thus marketplace 1 is slightly disadvantaged in terms of traders’ probability of choos-
ing marketplaces. For this setting, the evolutionary fee strategies of marketplace 1 and 2
are shown by Figures 13(a) and 13(b), and the dynamic changes of traders’ probabilities
of choosing marketplace 1 are shown in Figure 13(c). From these, we can see that in equi-
librium, all traders converge to marketplace 1, which is initially disadvantaged. The reason
is that from Figures 13(a) and 13(b), we can see that marketplace 1 decreases fees to at-
tract traders because of its disadvantageous position in the initial state, and marketplace 2
increases fees since it has an advantageous position in the initial state. Although there ex-
ist small ﬂuctuations for traders’ probabilities of choosing marketplaces because of the fee
changes of marketplace 1 and 2, eventually all traders will converge to marketplace 1. This
shows that it is possible for an initial disadvantaged marketplace to beat an advantaged one
by dynamically adapting its fees. We also ﬁnd that once marketplace 1 attracts all traders, it
will charge higher fees, around 70% proﬁt fee, but still keep traders. However, if we again
introduce randomisation with 20% random exploration probability (see Figure 14), we see
that the behaviour of the traders’ market selection changes signiﬁcantly.26 In detail, we can
see that marketplace 1 tries to charge a higher proﬁt fee, but because of random exploration,
traders will migrate to marketplace 2 (the cheaper marketplace). This causes marketplace 1
to reduce its fees and traders to migrate back to this marketplace.27 In fact, we observe that
the strategies of the traders and marketplaces never converge to an equilibrium. However,
by observing the overall evolutionary process, we still can see that, on average, marketplace
1 charges slightly higher fees than marketplace 2. Furthermore, when both competing mar-
ketplaces can only charge registration fees, we still ﬁnd that it is possible for the initially
disadvantaged marketplace to beat the initially advantaged one.
Two dierent marketplaces charging dierent types of fees:
In the above analysis, we consider the cases where marketplaces charge the same type of
fees. We now analyse how marketplaces evolve their fee strategies when dierent types
of fees are charged. We assume that marketplace 1 charges a proﬁt fee, and marketplace
2 charges a registration fee. Note that because of dierent scales between registration and
proﬁt fees, we just simply assume that initially marketplaces set each possible fee with an
equal probability and traders select each marketplace with an equal probability. Now the
co-evolutionary results are shown in Figure 15. We ﬁnd that traders eventually converge to
the same marketplace, which is in contrast to the previous analysis that when marketplaces
charge dierent types of fees, rich traders prefer marketplaces that charge registration fees,
and poor traders prefer marketplaces that charge proﬁt fees (see Section 4.2.2). In more de-
tail, from Figure 15(c), we ﬁnd that, initially, rich traders still prefer marketplace 2 charging
a registration fee, and poor traders prefer marketplace 1 charging a proﬁt fee, which is the
same as the previous analysis. However, from Figures 15(b) and 15(c), we can see that when
rich traders choose marketplace 2, this marketplace charges a higher registration fee, which
drives rich traders to leave marketplace 2. All traders eventually converge to marketplace 1.
Once all traders choose marketplace 1, from Figure 15(a), we can see marketplace 1 charges
90% proﬁt fee, but still keeps traders. Note that when running experiments from other initial
26 When the randomisation probability is less than 10%, we ﬁnd that traders’ behaviour does not change signiﬁcantly.
Therefore, here we look at 20% randomisation probability in order to show the changes of traders’ behaviour when it is
aected by the random exploration signiﬁcantly.
27 This is similar to the work done by Greenwald and Kephart (1999), where by adopting the derivative-following strategy,
the seller continues to increase its fees until it ﬁnds that its proﬁt falls. Then the seller begins to decrease its fees.33
(a) Fee strategy of marketplace 1. (b) Fee strategy of marketplace 2.
(c) Traders’ probability of choosing marketplace 1.
Fig. 13: Evolutionary process of fee strategies of marketplace 1 and 2 and traders’ probabil-
ity of choosing marketplace 1 when two competing marketplaces have dierent initial fee
strategies.
Fig. 14: Traders’ probability of choosing marketplace 1 with 20% random exploration when
two competing marketplaces have dierent initial fee strategies .34
(a) Fee strategy of marketplace 1. (b) Fee strategy of marketplace 2.
(c) Traders’ probability of choosing marketplace 1.
Fig. 15: Evolutionary process of fee strategies of marketplace 1 and 2 and traders’ probabil-
ity of choosing marketplace 1 when marketplace 1 charges a proﬁt fee and marketplace 2
charges a registration fee.
conditions, it may happen that eventually all traders converge to the marketplace charging a
registration fee, and when attracting all traders, the marketplace charges a high registration
fee.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a game-theoretic framework for analysing competing double
auction marketplaces. Based on this framework, we then analysed the equilibrium market
selection strategies for traders and fee strategies for marketplaces. We undertook the analysis
under the assumptions that there are two types of traders (rich and poor), and rich buyers
and rich sellers have the same learning behaviour and poor buyers and poor sellers have
the same learning behaviour. Although this is clearly a simpliﬁed setting, it is in line with
existing theoretical analysis in this broad area and is warranted because it sets the foundation
for subsequent analysis where these restrictions can gradually be relaxed.
More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst analysed the equilibrium behaviour of the traders’ market se-
lection strategies for dierent fee systems. By so doing, we found that in our framework,
traders will converge to one marketplace in equilibrium when the same type of fees are35
charged. However, when dierent types of fees are allowed, this strong market dierenti-
ation can cause co-existence of competing marketplaces in equilibrium, where rich traders
prefer the marketplaces charging registration fees, and poor traders prefer the marketplaces
charging proﬁt fees. Furthermore, we found that it is possible for a competing marketplace
to keep traders even when charging high fees if it already has a large market share. However,
when a small proportion of the traders randomly explore various marketplaces, it is more
dicult for the expensive marketplace to keep its traders. Furthermore, we also found that
when traders can shade their oers, it is easier for the expensive marketplace to keep traders
when both competing marketplaces can only charge proﬁt fees. Following this, we used a
co-evolutionary approach to analyse equilibrium fee strategies of marketplaces while taking
into account the dynamic changes of the traders’ market selection strategies. In doing so, we
found that, when both competing marketplaces are identical, they will charge the minimal
fee which can guarantee positive market proﬁts and traders select them with equal proba-
bility in equilibrium. Furthermore, we found that by evolving the fee strategy, an initially
disadvantaged marketplace can beat an initially advantaged one with a ﬁxed strategy, or even
also with an evolving fee strategy. We also showed that, when introducing random explo-
ration, the strategies of the traders and marketplaces will not always converge, but the fees
and movement of traders keep ﬂuctuating. In addition, when dierent types of fees are al-
lowed, dierent types of traders will prefer dierent marketplaces in the initial evolutionary
steps. However, as the evolutionary process proceeds, eventually all traders will converge
to one marketplace, and then this marketplace charges a high fee. When taken together, the
insights of our work will be useful to help to understand how traders select a marketplace,
and help to design a fee strategy for a competing marketplace. Speciﬁcally, they can be used
by entrants to design and analyse key facets of competing marketplaces for the CAT com-
petition and by enterprises running marketplaces to set fees in real-world economic activity.
There are still a number of avenues for future work. First, in this paper, we assume that
traders use ray bidding strategy with ﬁxed bid factors. While this oers important insights
into the fundamental nature of behaviour, we would like to see how traders evolve their ray
bidding strategies. In doing so, we are interested in analysing how market fees aect traders’
equilibriumbiddingstrategiesandhowmarketplacessetfeeswhentradersadoptequilibrium
bidding strategies. Second, in addition to considering ray bidding strategies, we also would
like to extend our framework in order to incorporate more advanced bidding strategies to
determine whether the same broad sets of behaviour are observed. Third, at present, our
theoretical analysis is limited to two types of traders. In the future, we would like to extend
our analysis to the case with more trader types and larger numbers of marketplaces. This
will enable us to model a wider range of real-world phenomena. Finally, at present, we have
assumedthatthecompetingmarketplacesusethesamematchingtechnology(i.e.theyalluse
the equilibrium matching policy). However, in practice, they may use dierent technologies,
as we see in the CAT competition, and we intend to analyse this using a similar approach as
we have done in this paper.
Acknowledgements This paper has been signiﬁcantly extended from a preliminary version that was pub-
lished previously (Shi et al, 2010b).
A Additional Experiments
In this appendix we present additional experimental results for those in Section 4.2.2 by considering dierent
starting points and dierent possible fee systems. We omit them from the main text because they provide no36
new insights, but are nevertheless useful in providing further support for the claims in Section 4.2.2. Speciﬁ-
cally, we show results with all fee systems, where we discretize the proﬁt and registration fees from 0 to 1 with
step size 0.1. For these settings we show the probability of traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium.
In more detail, for a given fee system, traders evolve from dierent starting points, from which we can obtain
the basin of attraction to each equilibrium. As we mentioned in Section 4.2.1, given the assumption that each
starting point is selected by traders with an equal probability, the size of the basin can be used as an indicator
of the probability of traders converging to that equilibrium (Tuyls and Parsons, 2007). By approximating the
size of each basin, we can estimate the probability of traders converging to each equilibrium. In the follow-
ing ﬁgures, we use dierent gray levels to indicate the probability of traders choosing each marketplace in
equilibrium (the darker, the higher the probability of traders choosing the marketplace indicated in the ﬁgure).
A.1 Both marketplaces only charging proﬁt fees:
Firstly, we present additional experimental results in the case where both marketplaces only charge proﬁt
fees. For this setting we show the probability of traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium in dierent
combinations of proﬁt fees (see Figure 16 for traders bidding truthfully and Figure 17 for traders shading
oers). Note that in this case the probability of rich traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium is
the same as that of poor traders. From these experiments, we still ﬁnd that traders always converge to the
same marketplace in equilibrium. Furthermore, comparing Figures 16 with 17, we can see that traders have
a slightly higher probability of choosing the expensive marketplace when traders can shade their oers than
when traders bid truthfully. All of these conclusions are consistent with our previous claims made from
Figures 1(a) and 1(b).
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(a) The probability of choosing marketplace 1.
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(b) The probability of choosing marketplace 2.
Fig. 16: The probability of rich and poor traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium. ab = as = 1.
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(a) The probability of choosing marketplace 1.
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(b) The probability of choosing marketplace 2.
Fig. 17: The probability of rich and poor traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium. ab = as = 0:8.
A.2 Both marketplaces only charging registration fees:
We now show the additional experimental results in the case where both marketplaces only charge registration
fees. We consider dierent combinations of registration fees, and show the results in Figures 18 and 19 where
traders bid truthfully. In this case the probabilities of rich and poor traders choosing each marketplace in
equilibrium are dierent. From these experiments, we still ﬁnd that in equilibrium, traders always converge
to the same marketplace, or no marketplace. Note that both rich and poor traders have a very small probability
of choosing no marketplace when registration fees in both marketplaces are high. However, the probability is
so small that it cannot be visualised. Therefore we omit them. These results are consistent with our previous
claims made from Figures 2(a) and 2(b). Note that when traders can shade their oers, these results are not37
aected signiﬁcantly since the absolute payments incurred from registration fees are not aected by shading.
Therefore, we do not show the results in this case.
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(a) The probability of choosing marketplace 1.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
 
Registration Fee of Marketplace 1
 
R
e
g
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
F
e
e
 
o
f
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
p
l
a
c
e
 
2
1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
(b) The probability of choosing marketplace 2.
Fig. 18: The probability of rich traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium. ab = as = 1.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
 
Registration Fee of Marketplace 1
 
R
e
g
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
F
e
e
 
o
f
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
p
l
a
c
e
 
2
1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
(a) The probability of choosing marketplace 1.
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(b) The probability of choosing marketplace 2.
Fig. 19: The probability of poor traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium. ab = as = 1.
A.3 Marketplace 1 charging a proﬁt fee and marketplace 2 charging a registration fee:
Furthermore, we show the additional experimental results in the case where marketplace 1 charges a proﬁt
fee and marketplace 2 charges a registration fee. We consider dierent combinations of these fees, and show
the results in Figures 20 and 21 where traders bid truthfully, and Figures 22 and 23 where traders shade their
oers. Again we can see that the conclusions are the same as those we made in Figures 3(a) and 3(b). In
more detail, comparing Figures 20 with 21, we can see that rich traders have a higher probability of choosing
marketplace 2 charging a registration fee, and poor traders have a higher probability of choosing marketplace
1 charging a proﬁt fee. Furthermore, by comparing Figures 20 and 22, and comparing Figures 21 and 23,
we also can see that when traders can shade their oers, the probability of traders converging marketplace 1
charging a proﬁt fee is increased since the payments incurred by proﬁt fees are reduced.
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(a) The probability of choosing marketplace 1.
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(b) The probability of choosing marketplace 2.
Fig. 20: The probability of rich traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium. ab = as = 1.38
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(a) The probability of choosing marketplace 1.
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(b) The probability of choosing marketplace 2.
Fig. 21: The probability of poor traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium. ab = as = 1.
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(a) The probability of choosing marketplace 1.
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(b) The probability of choosing marketplace 2.
Fig. 22: The probability of rich traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium. ab = as = 0:8.
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(a) The probability of choosing marketplace 1.
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Fig. 23: The probability of poor traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium. ab = as = 0:8.
A.4 Both marketplaces charging combinations of registration and proﬁt fees:
Finally, we show the additional experimental results in the case where both marketplaces can charge combi-
nations of registration and proﬁt fees. Here we discretize registration and proﬁt fees from 0 to 1 with step size
0.2, instead of 0.1, in order to reduce the fee system space. The results for dierent combinations of these
fees are shown in Figures 24 and 25. We still ﬁnd the same conclusions as those made in Figure 4, where we
can see that dierent types of traders may converge to dierent marketplaces in equilibrium, and when both
marketplaces charge high fees, traders may choose to visit no marketplace.39
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Fig. 24: The probability of rich traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium. ab = as = 1.
RF=Registration Fee; PF=Proﬁt Fee.40
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Fig. 25: The probability of poor traders choosing each marketplace in equilibrium. ab = as = 1.
RF=Registration Fee; PF=Proﬁt Fee.41
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